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Abstract. We investigated the memory colour effect for colour diagnostic artificial objects. Since
knowledge about these objects and their colours has been learned in everyday life, these stimuli
allow the investigation of the influence of acquired object knowledge on colour appearance. These
investigations are relevant for questions about how object and colour information in high-level vision
interact as well as for research about the influence of learning and experience on perception in
general. In order to identify suitable artificial objects, we developed a reaction time paradigm that
measures (subjective) colour diagnosticity. In the main experiment, participants adjusted sixteen such
objects to their typical colour as well as to grey. If the achromatic object appears in its typical colour,
then participants should adjust it to the opponent colour in order to subjectively perceive it as grey. We
found that knowledge about the typical colour influences the colour appearance of artificial objects.
This effect was particularly strong along the daylight axis.
Keywords: Memory Colours, Artificial Objects, Object Colours, Colour Diagnosticity, Colour Appearance, Daylight
Variation, Past Experience, Prior Knowledge
1 Introduction
What colour is a smurf? If you are very familiar with this imaginary creature, a particular blue
should come to your mind, and you should be able to answer immediately that a smurf is
blue. Now, does this internalised knowledge about the smurf’s typical colour by itself result
in your perceiving a smurf as being blue? Even when it is grey?
It has been shown, for fruit images, that knowledge about their typical colour influences
their colour appearance (Hansen et al 2006; Olkkonen et al 2008). If one knows, for example,
that a banana is yellow, it appears to be yellow even when it is completely achromatic. This
phenomenon is evidence for a memory colour effect. A memory colour is the typical colour
of an object that we have memorised due to our past experience with the respective object
(Bartleson 1960, page 73; Hering 1920 [1878], pages 6–7). The memory colour effect refers
to the idea that memory colours modulate the colour appearance of the respective objects’
actual colours. The memory colour effect requires that the object is strongly associated
with a typical colour and that the beholder is highly familiar with the object. How strongly
a particular object refers to a typical colour through memory colours is called colour
diagnosticity (Biederman and Ju 1988, page 41; Tanaka and Presnell 1999, page 1141). For
example, a banana may be considered as highly colour diagnostic, since it refers directly
to yellow. In contrast, a sock is not colour diagnostic but colour neutral, since socks occur
in many different colours. According to the original idea of memory colours, knowledge
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about the typical colour of an object should be acquired through frequent visual experience
with the respective object (Bartleson 1960, page 73; Hering 1920 [1878], page 7). To test this
idea, we investigated the memory colour effect for artificial objects. Artificial objects such
as the smurf are man made. Consequently, in contrast to natural objects, their colours are
not determined by nature but by humans. Everyday-life experiences with these objects are
bound to the cultural and historical context in which they occur. A mailbox is a good example.
While it is typically yellow in Germany, it is red in the United Kingdom, blue in the United
States, and green in China. A memory colour effect for these objects would indicate that the
colour appearance of objects is influenced through knowledge that has been learned during
past experiences.
This research question is relevant for at least two fields of research. Firstly, it contributes
to research about the influence of past experiences and learning on perception in general.
For example, Schyns and colleagues have used novel stimuli (ie, stimuli that do not exist
in everyday life) to show that people describe these stimuli differently depending on their
learning experience (Schyns and Rodet 1997; Schyns et al 1998). Moreover, Gosselin and
Schyns (2003) have shown that the assumption that a particular object exists in random
noise images led to the actual perception of these objects in the images. Such research shows
that human apprehension of reality is highly constructive and creative in nature. These
assumptions have been at the core of metatheories about the human mind in empiricism
(Hume 1894 [1748]), constructivism (Watzlawick 1984; Wittgenstein 1953), and situated
cognition (King 2000; O'Connor and Glenberg 2003; St Julien 1997). Since colour is such
an elementary visual attribute, it may be considered as a prime example for investigating
the influence of past experience on cognition. And, indeed, the first studies on the memory
colour effect were framed by this perspective (Adams 1923; Baker and Mackintosh 1955;
Bruner et al 1951; Duncker 1939; Fisher et al 1956; Harper 1953; Helmholtz 1867; Hering 1920
[1878]). Secondly, the present investigations contribute to a major question in the field of
colour research. From the perspective of colour research the question of whether we can
perceive objects and their colour independently of each other is tied to the debate about
functional segregation in high-level vision (Gegenfurtner 2003; Gegenfurtner and Kiper
2003). Functional segregation refers to the idea that colour is perceived separately from other
elementary visual attributes, such as shape, texture, or depth. On the neuropsychological
level this would imply that information about colour is processed by cortical cells that are
functionally separable from those that process other visual attributes (Wandell 1995, page
334). The question of whether the later cortical stages that are at the basis of our final visual
impression of the environment are functionally segregated is in the focus of today’s colour
research (Bloj et al 1999; Ling and Hurlbert 2004; Miceli et al 2001; Naor-Raz et al 2003, page
677; Werner 2007).
In the case of colour the beholder’s final visual impression is called colour appearance.
There are at least four phenomena of colour appearance where memory colours play a
major role. Firstly, memory colours help object and scene recognition (Tanaka et al 2001).
When the depicted objects are highly colour diagnostic, the presence of the object colours
boosts significantly scene recognition (Gegenfurtner and Rieger 2000; Oliva and Schyns
2000; Wichmann et al 2002) as well as object recognition (Humphrey et al 1994; Nagai and
Yokosawa 2003; Naor-Raz et al 2003; Nicholson and Humphrey 2003; Tanaka and Presnell
1999; Therriault et al 2009; but see Wurm et al 1993). Secondly, memory colours support
colour constancy (Emmerson and Ross 1987; Hurlbert and Ling 2005; Ling and Hurlbert 2006;
for a discussion see also Olkkonen et al 2008). Thirdly, memory colours are used in colour
memory (Ratner and McCarthy 1990; Siple and Springer 1983; Van Gulick and Tarr 2010).
When people have to memorise the colour of an object, their memory is led by the object’s
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typical colour. Finally, memory colours are involved in colour naming. It has been shown that
people name an ambiguous colour differently depending on how the ambiguous colour is
paired with colour diagnostic objects (Mitterer and de Ruiter 2008). This has also been shown
for culturally specific associations between objects and colour names (Mitterer et al 2009).
These findings indicate that memory colours work as a perceptual anchor that provides the
reference for visual estimations and judgements. In the light of these newer findings, the
old unresolved question of whether the role of memory colours is restricted to judgement
biases or involves an actual perceptual retuning of colour appearance (Harper 1953) gains
new relevance. To answer this question, it is crucial to investigate the direct involvement of
memory colours in colour appearance.
Indeed, several studies have shown an effect of memory colours on measures of colour
appearance. Early studies indicated that people overestimate the saturation of an object’s
diagnostic colours (Bartleson 1960; Duncker 1939; Harper 1953; Herring and Bryden 1970;
Newhall et al 1957; Siple and Springer 1983; White and Montgomery 1976). However, some
other studies found inconsistent results (Bolles et al 1959; Bruner et al 1951; Leibovich and
Paolera 1970; Pérez-Carpinell et al 1998), particularly for artificial objects such as a schematic
heart (Fisher et al 1956). Using different techniques, recent studies have confirmed that
people overestimate the amount of the typical hue in colour diagnostic fruit stimuli (Hansen
and Gegenfurtner 2006; Hurlbert and Ling 2005; less clear in Yendrikhovskij et al 1999, page
401, figure 5). While these findings may still be attributed to a judgemental bias, Olkkonen
and colleagues have finally shown that even grey fruits induced the perception of their typical
colour (Hansen et al 2006; Olkkonen et al 2008). Through a colour adjustment procedure, they
let participants adjust eight fruits so that they appear to be completely achromatic, that is
grey. They found that participants shifted the grey adjustments to the colour that is opposite
to the original colour of the respective fruit. This indicates that people counteracted the
impression of the typical colour when the object was actually grey. Hence, only by adjusting
the object in the opponent colour did it subjectively appear grey to them. Olkkonen et al
(2008) and Hansen and Gegenfurtner (2006) could even explain the inconsistency of memory
colour effects in earlier studies that used outline shapes (Bolles et al 1959; Bruner et al 1951;
Fisher et al 1956). They showed that the memory colour effect declines with the loss of
perceptual information, which is high for photos and very low for outline shapes.
Fruits, however, are a special kind of object; namely, they are natural objects. In general,
human colour vision is tuned to the natural environment throughout its phylogenesis
(Nathans 1999; Surridge et al 2003). And ripe fruits in particular are assumed to play an
important role in evolutionary adaptation (Regan et al 2001; Sumner and Mollon 2000). As
with other mechanisms of human colour vision, the particularities of fruit objects might
play a role in the memory colour effect because the human visual system is tuned to them.
Fruits have specific natural textures, shapes, and colour distributions. Moreover, the colour
distributions of the fruits used in the former experiments cover only a part of the colour
space. Since there are few saturated blue, purple, and pink fruits in our geographic region that
are at the same time highly colour diagnostic, the fruit stimuli were restricted to green, yellow,
orange, and red hues. The aforementioned studies on the role of perceptual information
in the memory colour effect (Hansen and Gegenfurtner 2006; Olkkonen et al 2008) used
stimuli that lacked natural texture and colour distributions. The observation that memory
colour effects decline for such objects may be understood as supporting the idea that these
object features play a particular role in the memory colour effect (Olkkonen et al 2008).
With regard to the actual determinants of the memory colour effect, another question arises.
The observed decline of the memory colour effect for stimuli with reduced perceptual
information might be due only to a decreased recognisability of the images. Alternatively, the
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memory colour effect might also be tied to perceptual features such as three dimensionality,
natural texture, or complex colour distributions. Furthermore, Joseph and Proffitt (1996)
have shown a strong interaction between object recognition and stored knowledge about the
typical object colour. This interaction occurred not only for images of objects but also for
the names of objects. With regard to the memory colour effect, we may therefore wonder
whether memory colour effects occur only for concrete objects or whether knowledge about
the association between a colour and a more abstract concept may also elicit memory colour
effects.
In the present study we wanted to make sure that the memory colour effect is really due
to learning through experience, and not to the particularities of natural objects or colour
distributions. For this reason we used artificial objects that are sampled throughout the whole
colour space. Artificial objects are man made, and their colour is determined by humans
too. As a result, their memory colours are bound to the cultural context in which the objects
occur. This implies that the association between these objects and their colours must be
learned in everyday life through experience with the objects. To investigate the perceptual
determinants of the memory colour effect, we selected artificial objects that varied in the
complexity of their perceptual features as well as in the abstractness of their colour diagnostic
characteristics. In our main experiment we tested whether the memory colour effect also
occurs for these artificial objects. If the memory colour effect is solely due to the learned
object–colour association, it should appear independently of the particularities of their
perceptual features. However, objects that are bound to a cultural context are particularly
prone to variability in colour diagnosticity. At the same time, high colour diagnosticity is a
prerequisite for the memory colour effect. In order to guarantee high colour diagnosticity for
our stimuli, we conducted a preliminary reaction time experiment to identify stimuli with
high diagnosticity.
2 Experiment 1: identification of colour diagnostic stimuli
Colour diagnosticity consists of two aspects. The objective aspect of colour diagnosticity
is the typicality or characteristicness of the object colour. This means that in the outside
world the object occurs unequivocally with only minor variations in a typical colour. The
subjective aspect of colour diagnosticity is that the beholder must know about the typicality
of the object colour. For example, when playing pool, the colour of the ball with number one
is always yellow. However, people who do not play pool very frequently may not be able to
recall the colour of the ball with number one. Moreover, for an interaction between memory
colour and colour appearance the association between the object and its typical colour must
be so strong that the object triggers the colour automatically. Finally, in order to produce a
memory colour effect, the object should be highly recognisable on the image used as the
stimulus. It must be recognisable, not only in its typical colour but also when the colour
changes during the colour adjustment procedure. The stimuli to be selected for the colour
adjustment procedure should maximise all these characteristics.
For this purpose, we developed a reaction-time paradigm. Tanaka and Presnell (1999)
have measured colour diagnosticity by the consistency with which their participants name
the typical colour of an object, and the consistency with which people include the typical
colour among the first three characteristic attributes of an object. However, these measures
are purely conceptual, not perceptual. They measure only semantic associations between
objects and features. They are primarily based on deliberate reflections, not automatic
reactions. Moreover, these measures do not guarantee that the images of the objects are well
recognisable since there is no image presentation in this procedure. Naor-Raz et al (2003)
have applied a Stroop interference task to colour diagnostic objects (cf Stroop 1935). They
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presented objects in colours that were congruent or incongruent with their typical colours.
When people had to name the presented colour of the object, Naor-Raz et al could show
an interference of the memory colour by reaction times. These reaction times measure
automatic object–colour associations, since Stroop interference is an automatic effect.
However, this measure might not be sensitive enough to differentially evaluate different
degrees of colour diagnosticity. Since a correct answer to the task can be given without
recognising the object, this measure will also not discard unrecognisable images by low
accuracy rates.
Instead, we used speed and accuracy to measure how well achromatic images are
associated with the typical colour of the depicted object. We converted a large pool of
candidate images into greyscale images. In each trial we presented one of these achromatic
images and let participants indicate as fast as possible the usual colour of the depicted
objects. In order to control for subjective colour diagnosticity, these measures were collected
for the same participants that took part in the colour adjustment experiment in a later
session. In regard to the dependent variables, low accuracy rates indicate that images
are either not recognisable or not colour diagnostic at all. Reaction times were used to
measure automaticity. Comparatively low average reaction times are assumed to separate
automatic object–colour associations from reflective, deliberative ones. At the same time,
subjective colour diagnosticity of candidate stimuli should be consistent over time and
across participants in order to produce a statistically reliable memory colour effect. Hence,
candidate stimuli should also yield a comparatively low variability of reaction times, as
measured through standard errors of mean across blocks and participants.
However, it is an open question as to whether low accuracy rates do identify inappropriate
stimuli, and whether reaction times can differentiate between different levels of automati-
sation of the colour–object association. Moreover, it is also an open question as to whether
there are supplementary influences besides the memory colour that significantly affect
the accuracy rates and the reaction times. In particular, even though we controlled for the
average luminance of the stimuli, there might still be some information about the original
colour in the luminance distribution and in luminance contrast. For example, in objects
that originally have a bright colour, such as yellow or pink, there is a wide transition range
between shades and the directly illuminated colour areas, but a short transition between
such areas and white gloss; for objects that had originally a dark colour, such as blue, the
inverse is true.
In order to verify whether our measures really represent memory colours, we included
eight kinds of control stimuli. For an overview of these kinds of control objects and the
corresponding predictions, see table 1. Firstly, we included a block with coloured disks, whose
actual colour had to be indicated. The reaction times for these responses should provide a
lower boundary to the reaction times for the achromatic images of colour diagnostic objects.
Secondly, we included objects that we considered a priori as unrecognisable and which
should yield low accuracy rates and high reaction times. For example, the grey silhouette
of an orange is basically a round disk, and it is difficult to recognise it as an orange. Thirdly,
there was a colour-neutral object, a striped sock, which we expected to elicit random colour
assignments and high reaction times. Fourthly, there was a woollen pompom that served
as a novel object that does not occur in everyday life. This novel object was shown in its
original colour once at the beginning of the experiment. Since people had to recall its colour
explicitly, colour assignments should result in high reaction times with high accuracy rates.
A small subgroup of the participants was familiarised in everyday life with this object. This
group should dispose of higher automatisation and, hence, show lower reaction times.
Fifthly, there were ambiguous objects, which exist in at least two colours in everyday life.
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Table 1. Predictions and results for control stimuli. The leftmost column describes the category of
control stimuli and gives an example for this category. The other columns show predictions and results
for accuracy rates and reactions times. Results shown in green conform to predictions, those in red
contradict predictions, and those in black cannot be differentiated because of ceiling effects; photos =
natural photos; outline = outline shapes, denat = ‘denaturalised’ (without natural texture), ie, white
painted. * than one row above. ** in the experiment the sock was upright (turned 90 deg. anticlockwise).
*** No sensible answer was possible, hence responses should be around 50%.
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For example, we included a pepper, which exists in red, yellow, and green. These objects
should yield low accuracy rates because of their ambiguity. Sixthly, there were ambiguous
objects, whose colour assignment could be determined through explicit inference because
the alternative colour was not available as a response option. For example, there was a grey
chess piece but no response option for ‘black’, only for ‘white’. These objects should yield
high accuracy rates and also high reaction times due to the time that is necessary for the
explicit inference. Together, the stimuli that involve explicit inference or recall should provide
an upper boundary for those reaction times that are good candidates to reveal automatic
colour diagnosticity. If our paradigm measures the degree of colour diagnosticity well, the
candidate stimuli should spread between the lower and upper borders. Seventhly, we also
added the stimuli from Olkkonen et al (2008) as well as the outline shapes from Duncker
(1939) to the pool of candidate stimuli. The correlation between the reaction times and the
memory colour effect of the stimuli from Olkkonen et al (2008) may inform us about the
relationship between the two measurements and validate this procedure. Finally, we also
added images of objects that have typically an achromatic colour in order to identify an
adequate control stimulus for the colour adjustment method (see below).
To choose the objects for the memory colour experiment, we applied the following
criteria to the stimulus selection. Stimuli that are not recognisable or not subjectively colour
diagnostic are not appropriate for the memory colour experiment. Hence, we discarded
all stimuli that had accuracy rates lower than 95%. Furthermore, the stimuli should have
the lowest average reaction times and low standard errors of mean. At the same time their
reaction times should be low enough to separate these stimuli well from stimuli with high
reaction times. Finally, the memory colours of the stimuli should cover different parts of the
colour space, especially those parts that were not sampled in the study of Olkkonen et al
(2008).
2.1 Method
There were several methodological and pragmatic constraints to the overall design of the
experimental paradigm. Firstly, we had to restrict the number of repetitions for each stimulus,
since a high repetition rate would induce a stimulus-specific automatisation of responses.
In order to obtain enough data, we compensated by collecting data from a large group
of participants. Moreover, due to another experiment (not reported here), we combined
the pool of images of artificial objects with a pool of natural objects. In order to indicate
the typical colour of a grey object, participants had to assign a Basic Colour Term to the
object. Basic Colour Terms are particularly useful for this task, since they refer to colour
categories that are most intuitive (in terms of particularly low reaction times) and that are
most consistent between individuals (Berlin and Kay 1969; Boynton and Olson 1990; Guest
and Van Laar 2000; Sturges and Whitfield 1997). In order to cover the whole colour space,
we used all eight chromatic Basic Colour Terms. Additionally, we included the achromatic
categories ‘grey’ and ‘white’ for the candidate control stimuli. Finally, we designed the
response mode by grouping the colour categories into pairs. The reason for using just two
colour terms in a block was to prevent spurious reaction times through key search and
increased false negative errors through key confusions. The categories were paired based on
three criteria. Firstly, the two categories should not be adjacent in colour space in order to
avoid hesitations and inter-individual differences in the categorisation of ambiguous object
colours. Secondly, in order to obtain equal prior probabilities for correct answers, the amount
of available stimuli should be approximately the same in the respective two categories.
Thirdly, the colours of the two categories should have approximately the same lightness.
This should avoid the possibility of luminance information influencing the responses. In a
compromise to meet these criteria, we paired blue with brown, red with yellow, green with
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orange, violet with grey, and pink with white. Please see table 2 for an overview of how colour
categories were paired.
Table 2. Stimuli of reaction time experiment. The rows show the different category pairings that
defined the two response options (order of columns is arbitrary). At the top of each cell the colour
name is shown with the overall number of stimuli in parentheses. The different kinds of objects are
listed separately (natural, artificial, or novel objects), followed by the number of the respective objects
in this category. In parentheses behind this number, objects are further specified as follows. In the
sample of artificial objects: obj = object (represents itself), sgn = sign (nonlinguistic symbol), lg = logo
(written label); in the sample of natural objects: ph = natural photos, den = ‘denaturalised’ (without
natural texture), out = outline shapes, cart = cartoons (clip-art drawings).
Category 1 Category 2
BLUE (26) BROWN (25)
Artificial: 11 ( 2obj, 4 sgn, 5 lg) Artificial: 6 (6 obj)
Natural: 15 (4 ph, 3 den, 4 out, 4 cart) Natural: 19 (7 ph, 3 den, 3 out, 6 cart)
YELLOW (26) RED (26)
Artificial: 10 (6 obj, 2 sgn, 2 lg) Artificial: 11 (5 obj, 5 sgn, 1 lg)
Natural: 15 (4 ph, 4 den, 3 out, 4 cart) Natural: 15 (4 ph, 3 den, 3 out, 4 cart)
Novel: 1 (Pompon)
GREEN (26) ORANGE (22)
Artificial: 9 (4 obj, 3 sgn, 2 lg) Artificial: 9 (7 obj, 2 lg)
Natural: 17 (5 ph, 3 den, 5 out, 4 cart) Natural: 13 (4 ph, 3 den, 3 out, 3 cart)
VIOLET (17) GREY (14)
Artificial: 1 (Milko) Artificial: 2 (2 obj)
Natural: 12 (3 ph, 3 den, 3 out, 5 cart) Natural: 12 (3 ph, 3 den, 3 out, 3 cart)
PINK (16) WHITE (19)
Artificial: 4 (2 obj, 2 lg) Artificial: 2 (obj)
Natural: 12 (3 ph, 3 den, 3 out, 3 cart) Natural: 17 (6 ph, 3 den, 3 out, 5 cart)
YELLOW EXAMPLES (5) RED EXAMPLES (4)
Artificial: 2 (1 ph, 1 out) Artificial: 2 (1 ph, 1 out)
Natural: 2 (1 ph, 1 out) Natural: 2 (1 cart, 1 out)
Novel: 1 (pompon)
2.1.1 Participants. Thirty-one participants (twenty-five women and six men; average age
= 25 years) were recruited by announcement and participated for financial remuneration.
Four of the participants were familiarised with the novel object. In their case the novel object
was placed on the desktop in their office more than two months before the experiment.
All participants had normal colour vision as tested with the Ishihara plates (Ishihara 2004).
All experiments in this study were carried out in accordance with the relevant institutional
and national regulations and legislation and with the World Medical Association Helsinki
Declaration as revised in October 2008 (http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/).
2.1.2 Apparatus. The monitor used to display stimuli was an Iiyama MA203DT monitor
driven by a NVIDIA graphics card with a colour resolution of 8 bits per channel. Spatial
resolution was set to 1152 x 864 pixels and the refresh rate to 75 Hz. For calibration the spectra
of the monitor primaries were measured with a Photo Research PR650 spectroradiometer. For
gamma correction, primary intensities were measured with a UDT Instruments model 370
optometer with a model 265 photometric filter. These measurements were used to make look-
up tables to correct for nonlinearities. Experiments were written in MatLab (MathWorks Inc
2007) with the Psychophysics toolbox extensions (Brainard 1997; Pelli 1997). The seed for
the randomisation procedures in the experiment was set in relation to computer time. An
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Table 3. Stimuli of reaction time experiment. The rows show the different category pairings that
defined the two response options (order of columns is arbitrary). At the top of each cell the colour
name is shown with the overall number of stimuli in parentheses. The different kinds of objects are
listed separately (natural, artificial, or novel objects), followed by the number of the respective objects
in this category. In parentheses behind this number, objects are further specified as follows. In the
sample of artificial objects: obj = object (represents itself), sgn = sign (nonlinguistic symbol), lg = logo
(written label); in the sample of natural objects: ph = natural photos, den = ‘denaturalised’ (without
natural texture), out = outline shapes, cart = cartoons (clip-art drawings).
Category 1 Category 2
BLUE (26) BROWN (25)
Artificial: 11 ( 2obj, 4 sgn, 5 lg) Artificial: 6 (6 obj)
Natural: 15 (4 ph, 3 den, 4 out, 4 cart) Natural: 19 (7 ph, 3 den, 3 out, 6 cart)
YELLOW (26) RED (26)
Artificial: 10 (6 obj, 2 sgn, 2 lg) Artificial: 11 (5 obj, 5 sgn, 1 lg)
Natural: 15 (4 ph, 4 den, 3 out, 4 cart) Natural: 15 (4 ph, 3 den, 3 out, 4 cart)
Novel: 1 (Pompon)
GREEN (26) ORANGE (22)
Artificial: 9 (4 obj, 3 sgn, 2 lg) Artificial: 9 (7 obj, 2 lg)
Natural: 17 (5 ph, 3 den, 5 out, 4 cart) Natural: 13 (4 ph, 3 den, 3 out, 3 cart)
VIOLET (17) GREY (14)
Artificial: 1 (Milko) Artificial: 2 (2 obj)
Natural: 12 (3 ph, 3 den, 3 out, 5 cart) Natural: 12 (3 ph, 3 den, 3 out, 3 cart)
PINK (16) WHITE (19)
Artificial: 4 (2 obj, 2 lg) Artificial: 2 (obj)
Natural: 12 (3 ph, 3 den, 3 out, 3 cart) Natural: 17 (6 ph, 3 den, 3 out, 5 cart)
YELLOW EXAMPLES (5) RED EXAMPLES (4)
Artificial: 2 (1 ph, 1 out) Artificial: 2 (1 ph, 1 out)
Natural: 2 (1 ph, 1 out) Natural: 2 (1 cart, 1 out)
Novel: 1 (pompon)
ActiveWire-compatible input device was used with an ActiveWire driver to record responses
(ActiveWire Inc 2003). This was done to avoid noise in reactions times, such as the one
produced by the keyboard buffer. Variability of pure time measurements was below 1 ms.
During the experiment the distance to the monitor was controlled through a chin rest that
was 65.5 cm away from the monitor.
2.1.3 Stimuli. For an overview of the composition of the stimulus set, please see table 2.
We assembled a set of overall 218 images of objects, either from the Internet or by taking
photos ourselves. Among these there were only sixty-five artificial objects. Two others were
the colour-neutral object and the novel object. The colour-neutral object was a sock with
orange and red stripes. The novel object was a yellow handmade, woollen pompon.
The other stimuli were 151 images of natural objects. This ensemble of natural images
consisted of forty-six photos of original objects, thirty-two photos of objects with an artificial
texture (ie, white-painted objects or reproductions in porcelain or plastic), forty-one clipart
cartoons and drawings, as well as thirty-two outline shapes of some of the photos. Among
these were the different versions of the eight fruits and vegetables (here summarised as
‘fruits’) used by Olkkonen et al (2008). These were courgette, lettuce, grapes, banana, lemon,
orange, carrot, and strawberry. While there were eight natural photos and eight outline
shapes of these photos, there were only seven photos of white-painted fruits because the
lettuce could not be painted in white. There were also the outline shapes of the rose leaf and
the donkey used by Duncker (1939).
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Moreover, the following stimuli were control stimuli. Four outline shapes were barely
recognisable because they were more or less round disks. These were the silhouettes of a
blueberry, of the Earth, of an orange, and of a red cabbage. Three stimuli were ambiguous.
Firstly, there was a standard dustbin for bus stops in Germany. Even though the dustbin
in our photo was originally green, in Germany this kind of dustbin occurs in green as well
as in orange. Secondly, even though our pepper was originally red, peppers also exist in
yellow and green. Finally, we included the yellow Ferrari logo, since most people associate
the red car with Ferrari. Six stimuli were also ambiguous, but the correct colour assignment
could be inferred from the available response options. This was the case for the photo of
a blue emergency light such as the ones on police cars (which also exists in yellow), green
traffic lights (that are not easily distinguishable from red ones, when shown as an achromatic
image), the red side of a ping-pong racket (that could as well be the black side), the grey
photos of the orange and the green grapes from Olkkonen et al (that might as well depict a
grapefruit or blue grapes, respectively), and, finally, a white chess piece adjusted to middle
grey (that might also have been black originally).
In accordance with the criterion of approximately equal numbers within each category
pair, there were twenty-six blue and twenty-five brown stimuli, twenty-six yellow and twenty-
six red, twenty-six green and twenty-two orange, seventeen violet and fourteen grey, and
finally sixteen pink and nineteen white stimuli. In addition to these 218 stimuli, there were five
yellow and four red images for the practice trials. They consisted of photos (four), cartoons
(one) and outline shapes (four) of natural (four), artificial (four), and novel (pompom) objects.
If necessary, objects were manually segmented from the background using Adobe Photo-
shop (Adobe Systems Inc 2005). We set the background of these objects to a homogeneous
achromatic background of half the maximum monitor luminance (ie, 28 cd m-²). In order
to make these images achromatic, we converted them from RGB to Derrington-Krauskopf-
Lennie (DKL) colour space (Derrington et al 1984; Krauskopf et al 1982; MacLeod and Boynton
1979). This space consists of one achromatic luminance and two chromatic axes. Hence,
we can manipulate colour and luminance independently. We set the chromatic values of
the images to zero to obtain an achromatic image. In order to prevent information about
hue through luminance, we shifted the luminance distribution along the luminance axis so
that the average luminance of the greyscale image was isoluminant with the background.
However, some of the images would not be (or not be completely) visible if they were
isoluminant with the background. The reason for this was either that these images consisted
of a uniform area such as the outline shapes or that there were areas at the edge of the object
that had the luminance of the average image. In these cases we shifted the luminance so that
the average luminance of the images was slightly higher than the background (34 cd m-²).
The images have been resized so that the ordinal relationships of the original objects
were maintained. At the same time, size differences have been compressed so that small
objects could still be identified easily and large objects were still parafoveal. The smallest
object (photo of a tooth) subtended 1.6 deg x 2.2 deg visual angle (1.8 cm x 2.5 cm); the largest
(a photo of the sky), 12.1 deg x 10.4 deg (14 cm x 12 cm). Resizing was done by a nearest
neighbour method (ie, without interpolation) before colour conversion in order to avoid
distortion of the colour distributions.
For the measurement of baseline reaction times we used uniform and luminance-noise
disks. The colour of the uniform disks was defined by (approximately) the prototypes of
the respective ten Basic Colour Terms (red, green, purple, and so on). The noise disks were
produced by converting the uniform disks with the respective colour into DKL colour space.
Then, the luminance dimension was set to brown noise. This implies that pixels were set to
random luminance intensities with a spatial frequency of 1/f ². Brown noise corresponds
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approximately to the spatial frequency of the luminance in the fruit images (Hansen et al
2008, page 4). As a result these noise disks had an organic appearance. The size of the disks
was 1.9 deg (2.2 cm) in diameter.
2.1.4 Procedure. In the main task the achromatic images were presented on the screen and
participants had to indicate the typical colour of the respective object. Figure S1 in the
supplementary material illustrates the course of one trial of the main task. Each trial began
with a black fixation point on the grey background for 1000 ms. Then one of the images was
presented until a response was given. For this purpose participants had two keys available.
These keys corresponded to the two Basic Colour Terms that were coupled as described
above. Key assignment to the two colours of a colour category pair was randomised across
participants but stayed constant across the blocks for each participant. Before each block
with presentations of the grey objects there was a block with repeated presentations of
the coloured disks. In this way participants got used to the assignment of the categories
to the two keys so as to minimise spurious response patterns for the grey objects. After
pressing a response key, the corresponding colour name was displayed for 500 ms to reinforce
the coupling between colour names and response keys. Every naming block began with a
countdown of three seconds in order to get participants ready at the two response keys before
the first image was presented.
Before starting the experimental programme, the experimenter gave an oral overview of
the experiment. Then the experiment started with standardised written instructions on the
screen. The time for reading through the instructions also guaranteed that people adapted
to the grey background of the experimental setting. As the very first task participants were
shown the novel stimulus (the woollen pompom) in its original colour. They were instructed
to memorise its colour for the main task. In order to continue, they had to assign one of
the eight chromatic Basic Colour Terms to this object. Then, a short practice block began.
Since the practice objects were originally red and yellow (see stimuli section or table 2), the
practice block began with the presentations of yellow and red uniform and noise disks. In
the practice block each of the four disks was presented just once, which resulted in an overall
of only four disk presentations. After a pause the eight practice objects and the novel object
were presented in grey in random order. In the main part there was such a block for each
of the five category pairs. The order of these blocks was randomly permuted. Overall, there
were three series of all five blocks. In this main part the four coloured disks were repeated
five times each, resulting overall in twenty trials per block. After the presentation of the last
stimulus of the fifteenth block the colour-neutral stimulus, the sock, was presented without
transition, as if it was part of this last block. Possible answers to this stimulus depended on
which category pair was tested in the last block. The complete experiment lasted about 60
min.
In view of the low number of presentations of each image (three), it was important to
prevent spurious responses due to fatigue or boredom. To enhance motivation, we included
feedback after each block and a hall of fame at the end of the whole experiment. For the block-
wise feedback as well as for the hall of fame, a score was calculated. This score combined
reaction times and accuracy rates. Feedback was presented verbally and consisted of German
translations of ‘fantastic’ (on average about 100% correct, < 800 ms), ‘excellent’ (about 100%
correct, < 1000 ms), ‘very good’ (about 95%, < 1500 ms), ‘good’ (about 90%, 2 s), or ‘okay’
(about 75%, < 10 s). If a participant performed worse than okay, he or she was asked to
contact the experimenter. This, however, never happened. In the hall of fame, the ten best
scores were recorded. Participants were informed about the feedback and the hall of fame in
the introductory instructions. There, it was emphasised that high scores could be achieved
only with maximum accuracy.
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2.2 Results
For the single stimuli we calculated average reaction times and accuracy rates over the thirty-
one participants, over the three blocks per participant, and in the case of the disks, over
the five repetitions per block. For the coloured disks we simply averaged these measures
over the disk types (noise and colour) to obtain a central tendency for all disks. In the case
of the objects, however, the central tendency of these measures depends strongly on the
image sampling (eg, the proportion of unrecognisable images). In order to compare the
reaction times and accuracy rates for single objects with an appropriate central tendency of a
group of objects, we will therefore report the median of the single measures since the median
automatically excludes outlier stimuli (eg, unrecognised images). Moreover, the standard
errors for each object were calculated over all data points (thirty-one participants x three
blocks), and not over the means per participant. This was done because both interindividual
and intraindividual variations were important for our stimulus choice, and because the
averages per participant are strongly affected by the single values due to the low amount of
only three repetitions (ie, blocks). For all the measures of reaction times, only correct answers
were considered. Apart from that, no outliers were discarded from the analysis based on the
size of reaction times. The significance level for all statistical tests was set to alpha = 0.05.
2.2.1 Control stimuli. Overall, reaction times and accuracy rates for the control stimuli
followed the expected pattern. An overview of these results together with the predictions
may be found in table 1. For the coloured disks the overall average reaction time was 399
ms, with a minimum of 307 ms for the pink uniform disks and a maximum of 531 ms for the
orange uniform disks. The mean accuracy rate was 98%, with a minimum of 95% for the pink
noise disk and a maximum of 100% for yellow noise disk.
The accuracy rate and the average reaction times of particularly unrecognisable outline
shapes were 23% and 1277 ms for the blueberry, 80% and 1326 ms for the Earth, 90% and 1037
ms for the orange, and 78% and 1227 ms for the red cabbage, respectively. For comparison, the
median of the accuracy rates and the median of the average reaction times for all thirty-two
outline shapes were 95% and 721 ms, respectively. The forty-seven photos yielded medians
of 98% and 613 ms for the accuracy rates and the reaction times, respectively.
For the colour-neutral stimulus (sock) average reaction time was 1256 ms with a minimum
of 586 ms and a maximum of 4113 ms. Depending on the response pair of the last block,
different colour categories could be assigned to the sock. Category assignments were four to
blue by the four people with a blue–brown final block, nine to red in the eleven samples with
a red–yellow final block, seven to orange in the seven green–orange cases, three to violet for
the four violet–grey, and four to pink in the five pink–white cases.
The novel stimulus (pompom) yielded an accuracy rate of 91% and an average reaction
time of 1089 ms for the twenty-seven participants, who saw it only once at the beginning of
the experiment. The four people who were familiarised with this object answered with an
average accuracy of 100% and an average reaction time of 873 ms. This difference between
the two groups of participants was only marginally significant in a one-tailed t-test, t(84) =
1.4, p = 0.079.
Among the ambiguous images, the (green) bus-stop bin resulted in an accuracy rate of
58% and an average reaction time of 963 ms, the (red) pepper in 88% and 956 ms, and the
Ferrari logo in 52% and 912 ms, respectively. The average accuracy rates and reaction times
for stimuli with resolvable ambiguity were 92% and 772 ms for the blue light, 84% and 1142
ms for traffic lights, 97% and 903 ms for the ping-pong racket, 99% and 686 ms for the check
figure, 98% and 600 ms for the photo of the orange, and finally 97% and 676 ms for the photo
of the grapes, respectively.
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Finally, the silhouettes of Duncker (1939) resulted in an average accuracy rate and reaction
time of 100% and 591 ms for the donkey and 94% and 1001 ms for the rose leaf. The medians
of the accuracy rates and average reaction times for the eight photos of Olkkonen et al (2008)
were 98% and 612 ms. For the corresponding eight silhouettes these were 93% and 780 ms,
respectively. For the seven photos of the white-painted fruits these medians were 99% and 656
ms. We compared reaction times between the three formats (photo, white painted, outline
shape) through t-tests. For this purpose, reaction times were averaged across participants,
and t-tests were paired by objects and one tailed. The lettuce did not exist in the white-
painted format. Thus, comparisons that involved the photos of white-painted fruits were
restricted to seven objects, excluding the lettuce. The reaction-time differences between the
seven natural and the seven white-painted fruits were on average 44 ms and significantly
larger than zero, t(6) = 2.3, p = 0.03. The average difference between white-painted fruits
and outline shapes was 104 ms and marginally significant, t(6) = 1.8, p = 0.06. The average
difference between the eight natural photos and the eight outline shapes was 156 ms and
highly significant, t(7) = 3.1, p < 0.01. Olkkonen et al used only fifteen of these stimuli in
the second part of their first experiment. For this sample the five original fruits yielded 600
ms, the five white-painted fruits 660 ms, and the five outline shapes 719 ms. The correlation
between the reaction times and the memory colour effects of these fifteen stimuli was r
= −0.52 and with p = 0.047 significant (see figure 1). Memory colour effects are measured
through a memory colour index (MCI), which is explained in Olkkonen et al (2008, page 6) as
well as in the second part of this paper on the colour adjustment experiment.
Figure 1. Correlation between reaction times and memory colour effects for the stimuli used in the
second part of the first experiment in Olkkonen et al (2008). The x-axis shows the reaction times
measured as indices for colour diagnosticity and recognisability. The y-axis shows the memory colour
effect as measured through the memory colour index.
2.2.2 Candidate stimuli. The central tendency of the reaction times depends on the category
pairing—for example, the saliency of the categories. For this reason we will report the median
of the set of stimuli within a category pair as a reference for the reaction times of the single
objects. We will highlight the three ‘best’ stimuli. These are those stimuli that yielded the
lowest reaction times among the candidate artificial stimuli of each category. Moreover, we
verified whether the reaction times discriminate well between the candidate objects. For
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this purpose we compared the last of the three best stimuli (in terms of reaction times) of
each category with the worst among the stimuli of the whole category pair. The ‘worst’ is the
stimulus, which yielded highest reaction times among those that have not been excluded on
the basis of the 95% accuracy rate criterion. For this comparison we calculated a one-tailed
t-test.
For the overall fifty-one stimuli of the blue–brown pair the median reaction time was 614
ms (see figure 2a). The images of a blue light (92%), of Alf (94%), of a pharmacy vial (80%),
and of a brown pair of sunglasses (59%) led to less than 95% correct responses. For the blue
category a Nivea cream tin (574 ms), a blue traffic sign (591 ms), and the smurf (633 ms)
yielded the three lowest average reaction times. They also resulted in the smallest standard
errors (14 ms, 18 ms, and 20 ms, respectively). For brown the chair (559 ms, 22 ms), the closet
(583 ms, 22 ms), and the violin (608 ms, 23 ms) led to lowest average reaction times and
standard errors. The worst stimulus with an accuracy rate greater than 95% was the (blue) O2
logo. Its average reaction time (873 ms) was significantly different from the one of the smurf,
t(177) = 4.0, p < 0.01, as well as from the one of the closet, t(177) = 4.9, p < 0.01.
For the overall fifty-two stimuli of the yellow–red pair the median reaction time was 590
ms (see figure 2b). The McDonalds logo (86%), the priority street sign (94%), the radioactivity
sign (91%), the Ferrari logo (52%), the Reclam booklet (89%), and the German train company
logo (92%) resulted in accuracy rates below 95%. For yellow the German mailbox (572 ms),
the UHU glue tube (598 ms), and the tennis ball (599 ms) elicited the lowest average reaction
times for artificial objects. These stimuli had the third (20 ms), second (18 ms), and seventh
(23 ms) highest standard errors among the yellow artificial objects. For red, reaction times for
the Coke logo (575 ms), a schematic heart (576 ms), and the photo of a fire extinguisher (590
ms) were lowest. Standard errors were fifth (16 ms), first (14 ms), and third highest (14 ms),
respectively, among the red artificial objects. The (red) ping-pong racket (s. stimuli) yielded
the worst average reaction time (903 ms) of the yellow–red pair. It differed significantly from
the reaction times for the tennis ball, t(181) = 5.2, p < 0.01, as well as for the fire extinguisher,
t(180) = 5.8, p < 0.01.
The median reaction time for the forty-eight stimuli of the green–orange pair was 710
ms (see figure 2c). The ewer (94%), the exit sign (89%), the wine bottle (84%), the bus-stop
bin (58%), the green traffic lights (84%), Ernie from Sesame Street (92%), and the Elmex
toothpaste (76%) elicited less than 95% correct answers. For green the ping-pong table (715
ms), the German police car door (748 ms), and the recycling symbol (781 ms) yielded the
lowest average reaction times. They also resulted in the three lowest standard errors (23 ms,
28 ms, and 26 ms, respectively). For orange this was the case for Die Maus (The Mouse, a
German TV figure, 608 ms), the basket ball (654 ms), and the warning vest (676 ms). Standard
errors were also the three smallest (15 ms, 17 ms, and 13 ms, respectively). The worst of the
artificial objects, with an accuracy rate above 95%, was the (green) European Bio symbol (828
ms). Among the best green stimuli, only the reaction times for the ping-pong table differed
significantly from the one of the Bio symbol, t(182) = 2.2, p = 0.02. For orange, however, the
difference between the warning vest and the Bio symbol was significant, t(179) = 2.9, p < 0.01.
The median reaction time for the total of thirty-one stimuli of the violet–grey pair was
660 ms (see figure 2d). The Milka logo (92%) and the grey dustbin (92%) yielded accuracy
rates of less than 95%. For violet the Milka logo was the only artificial object and led to an
average reaction time of 740 ms. For grey only the lantern remained with a reaction time of
725 ms. For the thirty-five stimuli of the pink–white pair the median reaction time was 628
ms. Among the six artificial objects, only the €10 bill (90%) had to be excluded by the 95%
criterion. The remaining three pink artificial objects were the Pink Panther, the Barbie puppet
logo, and the German Telekom logo. Their mean reaction times and standard errors were
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596 ms, 773 ms, and 792 ms, as well as 19 ms, 48 ms, and 22 ms, respectively. The difference
between the mean reaction times of the Pink Panther and the Barbie logo was significant,
t(181) = 2.9, p < 0.01. Among the stimuli of the achromatic categories (grey and white) the
golf ball led to the smallest average reaction time (609 ms) and to the smallest standard error
(19 ms).
2.3 Discussion
As the first step, we wanted to verify whether this experimental paradigm is useful to measure
subjective colour diagnosticity of objects and the recognisability of their images. If the
paradigm works, we intended to identify those images that have the highest potential to elicit
a memory colour effect according to these measures. This should allow the selection of the
most appropriate stimuli for the colour adjustment experiment.
2.3.1 Evaluation of paradigm. We wanted to verify three assumptions about this paradigm.
Firstly, accuracy rates were supposed to identify those stimuli that are unrecognisable or that
lack any colour diagnosticity. Secondly, we wanted to guarantee that the information of the
memorised typical colour was the main factor that determines our dependent variables. In
particular we wanted to exclude that information of the luminance distribution influences
our measurements. And, finally, reaction times should be used to measure the automaticity
of the colour–object association. For this purpose they should show sensitivity to the degree
of automaticity of the answers. Table 1 facilitates the comparison between predictions and
results.
In general, accuracy rates were lowered for those stimuli we judged as difficult to recognise
or ambiguous in their typical colour (mostly < 90%). In contrast, ambiguous objects whose
colour could be inferred because of the available answer options led to higher accuracy rates
(mostly > 95%). However, not all of these stimuli yielded accuracy rates of approximately 50%
(eg, between 25% and 75%), as was the case for the bus-stop bin and the Ferrari logo. For
example, the silhouette of the orange led to responses slightly above 90%, despite its very
unspecific form. Moreover, the outline shapes in general did result in a quite high accuracy
rate (95%) in comparison with the photos (98%). This probably had to do with the fact that
the silhouettes of objects corresponded in size and shape to the photos of the same objects.
Finally, the error rates for categorising the coloured disks (between 0% and 5%) indicate that
there might be up to 5% of spurious errors. Taken together, we may conclude that the limit
of 5% errors is very sensible to exclude completely inappropriate stimuli without excluding
appropriate images due to spurious errors.
In order to prevent the influence of luminance information on the responses, the areas
of the typical colours of the stimuli were isoluminant with the background. Nevertheless,
we observed that accuracy rates and reaction times were influenced by information beyond
that of recognisability and colour diagnosticity. Some ambiguous stimuli such as the pepper
(88%) yielded accuracy rates that were much higher than chance (50%). Moreover, some
of the stimuli that were expected to necessitate explicit inference led to comparatively low
reaction times, such as the photos of the orange (600 ms), of the green grapes (676 ms), and
of the white chess piece (686 ms). In some cases this might be due to the fact that some of the
original exemplars of the ambiguous stimuli were more typical than the alternative variant,
such as the red versus the yellow pepper, or the orange versus the grapefruit. However,
the responses to the colour-neutral sock also seemed not to be equally distributed over the
category pairs: the sock was assigned more often to its original colours than to the alternatives
if the original colours were among the category pairs (82% red instead of yellow and 100%
orange instead of green). This might imply that the luminance distribution provides some
relevant colour information. However, it might also be the case that participants simply
knew this kind of sock or associated very intense colours like red and orange with the striped
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Figure 2. Reaction times and accuracy rates for candidate objects. The different parts of the figure
correspond to the category pairings (cf table 2). The x-axis lists the artificial objects of each category
in the order of their average reactions times. The y-axis represents reaction times in ms for correct
responses. Coloured disks show reaction times averaged over thirty-one participants; the respective
error bars depict standard errors of mean. The grey line corresponds to the median reaction time of
the whole category pair, that is, including the natural objects. Category pairs are: (a) blue–brown, (b)
yellow–red, (c) green–orange, and (d) violet–grey and pink–white.
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pattern of the sock. In sum, we cannot completely exclude that the luminance distributions
provide information about the original colours.
Reaction times differentiated well between different levels of familiarity. Through the
maximum reaction times for coloured disks (531 ms) we determined a lower boundary for
reaction times at about 550 ms. In contrast, participants reacted only after long thinking times
(> 1 s) to the colour-neutral sock, indicating that its appearance perplexed them. Additionally,
reaction times for those stimuli we had previously judged as unrecognisable also exceeded 1
s. Therefore, the region around 1000 ms may be a reasonable upper boundary to evaluate
the degree of the participant’s familiarity with the object–colour association. Within this
range from 550 ms to 1000 ms we could dissociate automatic from explicitly deliberated
responses—with some limitations. Stimuli to which participants could respond correctly
through explicit inference and recall should result in comparatively high reaction times with
moderate error rates. This was the case for ambiguous stimuli such as the blue lights (772
ms and 92%) and the ping-pong bat (903 ms and 97%), as well as for the woollen novel
object (1.089 ms and 91%). Moreover, the reaction times to the novel object showed the right
tendency to differentiate between the untrained group and the group that was familiarised
with the real object (873 ms). However, the difference between the two groups was only
marginally significant (p = 0.079). But not all predictions could be confirmed. Some of the
ambiguous stimuli yielded reaction times that were close to or even lower than the median
such as the photo of the orange (600 ms) or of the grapes (676 ms). Moreover, the median
reaction times could not provide a reliable border to separate automaticity from explicit
inference since the medians varied quite considerably across colour category pairs. The
minimum was 594 ms for the yellow–red pair and the maximum 717 ms for the green–orange
pair. This difference could not be explained by different numbers of stimuli since these pairs
contained an approximately equal number of stimuli (n = 52 and 48). Nevertheless, we still
found within each category pair significant differences between fast and slow stimuli. ‘Fast
stimuli’ can be identified as those for which the difference to the stimulus with the largest
reaction time was significant. This indicates that a meaningful division between stimuli with
low and high reaction times is possible. Among these fast stimuli the lowest reaction times
varied between 559 ms (brown chair) and 715 ms (green ping-pong table). The fact that the
fastest reaction times are close to the lower reaction time border (550 ms) suggests that the
knowledge about the respective object–colour association is automatised.
Furthermore, we found for the fifteen stimuli of Olkkonen et al (2008, second part of first
experiment) that the reaction times correlated with the memory colour effect. This shows
that the characteristics of the stimuli measured by this paradigm play a role in the memory
colour effect. However, the total variance explained by this correlation is only 27%. Moreover,
a main part of this correlation seems to be due to the fact that the outline shapes were
less recognisable. Hence, they yielded not only higher error rates, but also higher reaction
times as well as lower memory colour effects (see figure 1). In fact, the order of reaction
times resembled the inverse order of the memory colour effects for outline shapes, photos
of white-painted fruits, and photos of original fruits: the five outline shapes had highest
reaction times (719 ms) and lowest memory colour effects (1.2%), the five photos of natural
fruits lowest reaction times (600 ms) and highest memory colour effects (9.5%), and the
others were in between (660 ms and 5.6%). Furthermore, Duncker’s (1939) silhouette of a
rose leaf seemed also to be poorly recognisable. Its accuracy rate (94%) and reaction time
(1001 ms) were beyond the borders for accuracy rate and reaction time defined above (<
95%, > 1000 ms). Therefore, the relationship between reaction times in our experiment and
memory colour effects support the idea of Olkkonen et al (2008) that the unreliable results of
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earlier studies on the memory colour effect were due to the low spontaneous recognisability
of the outline shapes.
In sum, we may conclude that our paradigm provides a sensible measure of colour
diagnosticity. This measure allows the identification of those stimuli that hold a potential
to elicit memory colour effects. More precisely, the paradigm successfully separates stimuli
with a particularly high degree of automatised object–colour association from those with
only uncertain or deliberative object–colour association. And at this level of resolution the
reaction times may predict memory colour effects: objects with particularly low reaction
times, such as the photo of the banana, yielded high memory colour effects; objects with
extremely high reaction times, such as the outline shape of the orange, led to low memory
colour effects. Therefore, the paradigm may separate stimuli with a particularly high potential
for memory colour effects from those with a particularly low potential for memory colour
effects. It is no surprise, however, that the relationship between reaction times and memory
colour effects does not resolve into finer nuances. The precise variation of both reaction times
and memory colour effects may be influenced by factors other than colour diagnosticity. On
the one hand, factors such as the objects’ absolute size, the saliency of their shapes, as well
as luminance contrast may influence the size of reaction times. On the other hand, factors
such as overall saturation, the saliency of colour as an object feature, and—as we will see
later—the hue itself may have an impact on the size of memory colour effects.
Note that these and other particularities of the images in our stimulus pool also limit a
general interpretation of the reaction times. For example, among the artificial objects we
found particularly low reaction times for the chair (559 ms), the German mailbox (572 ms),
the Nivea tin (574 ms), and the Coke logo (575 ms). Among the natural objects there were
still lower reaction times, in particular for the clipart cartoon of a banana (520 ms) and a
strawberry (520 ms). One might wonder whether the association between object and colour
is particularly strong for these objects. Furthermore, the median reaction time across objects
was comparatively high for the green, violet, and pink category, namely 735 ms, 722 ms, and
709 ms, respectively. In contrast, it was not only the median reaction times of the achromatic
categories grey (564 ms) and white (584 ms) that were particularly low; those of the yellow,
red, and brown categories were also comparatively low with 585 ms, 599 ms, and 608 ms,
respectively. Here, one might wonder whether these striking differences were due to the
nature of the involved colour categories. However, our findings cannot yet be generalised
neither for the depicted objects nor for the colour categories. To answer the two questions
above a procedure that objectively controls for comparable object images and stimulus sets
in all categories is required.
2.3.2 Stimulus selection. According to the average reaction times, green stimuli were less
appropriate to verify memory colours. In contrast to other colour category pairs, reaction
times for the best green stimuli were higher than 700 ms. And only one of them, the ping-
pong table, led to significantly lower reaction times than the image with highest reaction
times. For the orange stimuli reaction times were also quite high (> 650 ms), except for the
best stimulus (608 ms). Moreover, there were already several green and orange stimuli in
the study by Olkkonen et al (2008). The inverse was true for blue and red stimuli. For this
reason we decided to include only one stimulus of the green and orange categories and—in
turn—three of the blue and red ones. For pink there was also only one stimulus that yielded
a reaction time of under 700 ms, and this was significantly lower than the average reaction
time for the next higher stimulus. The violet stimulus would usually be excluded. But, since
Olkkonen et al did not have any violet stimulus and since it was the only one we had for
violet, we included it nevertheless. From the group of brown and yellow stimuli we took
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two. Finally, we chose the most colour diagnostic among the grey and white stimuli and the
colour-neutral stimulus as control stimuli.
In this way the following sixteen stimuli were chosen for the colour adjustment experi-
ment:
• the Nivea tin, the blue traffic sign, and the smurf for the blue category (3),
• the chair and the closet for the brown category (2),
• the German mailbox and the UHU glue stick for the yellow category (2),
• the Coke logo, the schematic heart, and the fire extinguisher for the red category (3),
• the German TV figure Die Maus for the orange category (1),
• the ping-pong table for the green category (1),
• the Pink Panther for the pink category (1),
• the Milka chocolate bar for the violet category (1),
• the golf ball as the achromatic control stimulus (1), and
• the sock as the colour-neutral control stimulus (1).
With the exception of the green and violet categories, these stimuli yielded reaction times
between 550 ms and 650 ms. In this way they were close to the lower (550 ms) and far from
the upper boundary (1000 ms) for reaction times as defined above.
3 Experiment 2: investigation of memory colour effects
This experiment investigated whether knowledge about object colour modulates the colour
appearance of the highly colour diagnostic artificial objects determined in the previous
experiment. For this purpose we used the same methods as Olkkonen et al (2008). In order to
measure colour appearance we let our participants adjust the colour of the objects. We tested
the same hypothesis for these manmade objects as Olkkonen et al (2008) did for the fruits: if
memory colour influences the appearance of the actual colour, the objects should appear
slightly in their typical colour when they are achromatic, ie grey. Therefore, when adjusting
the object to grey, the participants should shift the colour toward the colour opponent to
the object colour. In this way they would counteract their subjective impression of apparent
object colour at the grey point. So, in order to measure the main dependent variable we let
participants adjust the colour of each object to achromatic grey. To determine the memory
colour that people have in mind for each object, we also let people adjust the colours of
the objects to their typical colours. Moreover, since there might be systematic distortions
of the colour appearance of the objective grey, we also measured observers’ subjective grey
point. Therefore, we let observers adjust disks with either a uniform colour or a brown noise
(1/f ²) luminance distribution. These subjective grey points represent the actual colour that
the respective observer perceives as achromatic when there is no interference of memory
colours. For this reason the subjective grey point of each individual observer separately was
used to evaluate memory colour effects.
As announced in the introduction, the artificial objects used in this experiment varied
in the complexity of their perceptual features as well as in the abstractness of their colour
diagnostic characteristics (see figure 3). On the one hand, the perceptual complexity varied
on three levels. The most complex stimuli were photos of three-dimensional objects.
These stimuli had a surface texture, and provided complex colour distributions, ie colour
distributions that contained a multitude of different hue and saturation nuances. The stimuli
in this class were the red fire extinguisher, the brown chair and closet, the green ping-pong
table, the yellow mailbox and UHU glue stick, as well as the blue Nivea tin. Then, there were
also two-dimensional stimuli with complex colour distributions, namely the violet Milka
chocolate bar picture and the red Coca Cola logo. Finally, two-dimensional images that were
composed of only uniform colour surfaces were considered as perceptually least complex.
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These included the Pink Panther, the orange Die Maus, the red heart, as well as the blue
smurf and traffic sign (the latter was not shown as a realistic photo, but as an icon). On the
other hand, the degree of abstractness also varied on three levels. Firstly, there were concrete
objects that directly represented themselves. Among these were the red fire extinguisher and
heart, the brown chair and closet, the green ping-pong table, the Pink Panther, the orange
Die Maus, as well as the blue smurf. In contrast, there were also objects whose characteristic
features were symbols or writings, such as a traffic sign or a brand logo. These features must
be interpreted symbolically and refer to abstract ideas such as a traffic rule or a company
identity, respectively. Among the symbols, secondly, there was the blue traffic sign and the
yellow mailbox. Thirdly, logos with written names must even be interpreted linguistically
before they may refer to a name, which by itself refers to a company. To this last group
belonged the yellow UHU glue stick, the blue Nivea tin, the violet Milka chocolate bar, and
the red Coca Cola logo. This selection of stimuli allows us to test whether memory colour
effects may also be elicited by two-dimensional objects with simple colour distributions. And
we can verify whether these effects also occur for stimuli whose object identity is defined
through abstract symbolic associations.
In addition, we included the aforementioned two control objects to verify whether there
were systematic distortions of colour adjustments due to the presentation of objects in gen-
eral. Firstly, we added the golf ball as an object that is naturally achromatic. This stimulus was
used to verify whether there are systematic deviations of colour adjustments independently
of memory colours for objects with natural colour and luminance distributions. Secondly, we
also used the sock with orange–red stripes. A sock is not colour diagnostic since it may exist
in different colours. We showed this sock in its original colour only once at the beginning
of the whole experiment. It might be that there are influences of seeing the objects in the
original colour before achromatic adjustment. If this was the case the sock should reveal
memory colour effects even though its colour had not been internalised through experience.
A memory colour effect is shown if the achromatic adjustments are shifted away from
the subjective grey point towards the colour opponent to the object’s typical colour. If
the memory colour effect is only due to the learned object–colour association, it should
appear for all fourteen objects in the same way, independently of their perceptual complexity
and the abstractness of their characteristics. Finally, if all assumptions about the memory
colour effect apply, both of the control objects (golf ball and sock) should not be shifted
systematically away from the subjective grey point.
3.1 Method
Overall, the method and setup of this experiment were the same as in Olkkonen et al (2008).
Details may be found there. Here, we focus on some slight modifications to this method,
which were applied to improve methodological stringency. In addition, there was one overall
difference to the design of Olkkonen et al (2008) in that we had fewer repetitions per object.
This was due to the fact that we had more objects (sixteen instead of eight), and that we did
not want to extend the experiment to more than one hour. To compensate for the smaller
amount of data per participant, we recruited more participants.
3.1.1 Participants. In this experiment, twenty-five of the thirty-one participants of the first
experiment participated for financial remuneration. This sample was composed of twenty-
three women and two men; average age was 26 years. All participants were naive as to the
purpose of the experiment.
3.1.2 Apparatus. This experiment took place in the same experimental chamber with
controlled illumination as used by Olkkonen et al (2008). This setup differs from the one
used for the reaction time experiment (see above). The setup had been recalibrated for
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Figure 3. Features of the fourteen colour diagnostic stimuli used in the colour adjustment experiment.
Columns show how the stimuli vary in the complexity of their perceptual features. Stimuli on the right
depict three-dimensional objects with a texture and a complex colour distribution. Stimuli on the left
are two dimensional and consist merely of uniformly coloured areas. The two stimuli in the centre
column are two dimensional, but have a texture and a complex colour distribution. Rows represent
the degree of abstractness of the identificatory feature. Stimuli in the top row are objects. This implies
that they represent themselves. The main features of the stimuli in the centre and in the bottom row
are symbols or writings, respectively. They have to be interpreted symbolically. Moreover, they refer to
abstract ideas such as a traffic rule in the case of the traffic sign or a company identity in the case of
the brand logos.
this experiment. The resulting Judd-revised CIE chromaticity coordinates for the monitor
primaries were now: R = (0.615 0.348 20.6), G = (0.283 0.606 59.6), and B = (0.156 0.083 8.3).
The look-up tables for gamma correction were also updated. Lamps were recalibrated by
letting four observers adjust the lightness and hue of the lamps to be equal to the one of the
grey background of the monitor. The measured Judd-corrected chromaticity coordinates for
the lamps were x = 0.302, y = 0.358, and Y = 42.2. The monitor was placed at the end of a 60
cm-long tunnel, which opened out into the experimental chamber. This tunnel prevented
reflections of the illumination on the monitor. The chamber was 125 cm long. Hence, the
distance between chin rest and monitor was 185 cm. For randomisation the seed was set in
relation to computer time.
3.1.3 Stimuli. Besides the stimuli selected by the preliminary experiment, we added three
stimuli for practice trials: a yellow rubber duck, a lifesaver with red stripes, and a blue Aral
logo. The first two were part of the practice trials and the last was part of the main stimuli of
the preliminary reaction time experiment. The uniform and the noise disk used to measure
the subjective grey point were constructed in the same way as in the preliminary experiment.
The background luminance was set to half the maximum luminance of the monitor. The
Judd-revised chromaticity coordinates of the background were x = 0.311, y = 0.344, Y = 44.2.
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As described in Olkkonen et al (2008), the original RGB images were converted to
the colour-opponent DKL space (cf experiment 1). This allowed the standardisation of
luminance and implementation of colour adjustments during the experiment. Also, the
colour adjustment was made only for the chromatic dimensions while holding luminance
constant. Some of the objects, however, might contain more than one colour. For example,
the blue smurf has a white hat and white trousers. With the fruits in Olkkonen et al (2008)
this problem appeared only for the strawberry. In this case the authors could remove the
green part of the strawberry without making it unrecognisable. A corresponding treatment,
however, would completely destroy the identity of some of the artificial objects. Therefore,
we converted the colour distribution of such parts to achromatic grey. During the colour
adjustment of the characteristic colour distribution, these parts did not change. This
procedure was used for the following seven objects: the smurf, the traffic sign, the Nivea tin,
the ping-pong table, Die Maus, the fire extinguisher, and the Milka chocolate bar. Figure S1
in the supplementary material provides an overview of the areas that were kept achromatic
during the colour adjustments as well as an overview of the appearance of the respective
objects at the average typical and achromatic adjustments. Only for Die Maus, the fire
extinguisher, and the Milka chocolate bar did these manipulations concern chromatic areas
at all. The colourful area that was held constant in the Milka chocolate bar was a tiny cow bell.
For the fire extinguisher it concerned a small yellow button that could have been grey as well,
ie that was not colour diagnostic. For Die Maus this manipulation turned the brown arms,
legs, and ears into grey, which also did not strongly change the appearance of this object.
For the other objects the concerned areas were originally achromatic. For example, this
was the case for the text and handle of the fire extinguisher, the Nivea logo, and the smurf’s
clothes. The only reason for controlling these was that in the digital images of the objects the
respective areas may not be completely achromatic. Instead, they may have slight shades
of colours due to the overall colour of, or due to shadings within, the whole image. During
the colour adjustment this might have led to artefacts when participants oversaturate the
stimulus. In sum, we may assume that keeping these areas achromatic during the adjustment
did not strongly affect the appearance of these seven objects.
This treatment, however, leads to a dilemma. Olkkonen et al (2008) set the mean
luminance of each complete image to the luminance of the background. If we do this for
example with the smurf, the blue areas would be shifted towards a luminance that is darker
than the original one. This is due to the large white parts of the smurf. This treatment would
provide a completely distorted luminance cue to the beholder. Moreover, it would have
shifted some of the colours outside the monitor gamut by increasing their luminance. Hence
we decided to control only the luminance of the area with the typical colour, which is adjusted
during the experiment. If we set the mean luminance of this area to the luminance of the
background, however, this would blur many of the objects with colour distributions (eg Nivea
tin, ping-pong table). It would also render uniform colour areas completely equal to the
background. In this way the colour adjustment task would become a discrimination task
for images such as the smurf, the traffic sign, or the heart. For these reasons we decided to
keep the polarity (+/–) of the difference between the luminance of the background and the
original average luminance of the typical colour. As a result, a colour diagnostic area that was
originally lighter than the background would also be lighter in the experiment, and vice versa.
We just limited the difference to a standardised luminance shift of 8.8 cd m-² upwards or
downwards from the background luminance. The average luminance of the following stimuli
was set to the luminance of 35.4 cd m-² (background luminance –8.8 cd m-²): the blue traffic
sign, the blue Nivea tin, the violet Milka chocolate bar, the red Coca Cola logo, the red heart,
the red fire extinguisher, the green ping-pong table, and the red–orange sock. The average
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luminance of the typical colour area of the blue smurf, the Pink Panther, and the orange Die
Maus was set to 53.1 cd m-² (background luminance +8.8 cd m-²). The average luminance of
the typically coloured areas of the yellow UHU glue stick, the yellow German mailbox, the
brown chair, the brown closet, and the white golf ball could be set to the luminance of the
background. For these images this did not lead to the aforementioned problems because
they contained strong luminance contrasts due to shadows. Finally, the two kinds of disks
were set to +8.8 cd m-² above the background luminance.
Like in the first experiment, the size of the images was adjusted to keep the relative order
of sizes of the original objects, but size differences were squeezed. The sizes of the images
varied on this setup between 1.24 deg x 1.24 deg visual angle (4 cm diameter) for the golf ball
and 4.48 deg x 2.48 deg visual angle (14.5 cm x 8 cm) for the closet. The disks were set to 1.70
deg (5.5 cm) in diameter. Finally, during the whole experiment the lamps in the chamber
were set to approximately the same lightness and hue as the grey monitor background as
described in the ‘apparatus’ section.
3.1.4 Procedure. In one trial of the main task the image of an object appeared in a random
colour on the screen. Participants were instructed to adjust its colour either to the object’s
typical colour or to grey, depending on the experimental condition. In contrast to Olkkonen
et al (2008) this random colour was drawn from a circle in the colour space. The radius of
this circle corresponds to the saturation, the azimuth to the hue. Colours were sampled so
that they had the same hue distance to the adjacent colours. Hence, the azimuth distance
between adjacent hues was 360° divided by the number of stimuli. This number was sixteen
for the typical and eighteen for the achromatic adjustments, which included the two disks.
This was done in order to prevent colours from being drawn from particular parts of the
colour space by chance. In order to randomise the colours, this circle was turned by a random
azimuth for each participant, and colours were assigned randomly to each object. As a result,
the colour space was sampled homogeneously for each participant and colours were still
random. This hue circle was located at approximately half of the maximum saturation. In this
way, participants were forced to make adjustments in every trial of both conditions because
the start colours were too unsaturated for the typical and too colourful for the achromatic
colours.
In order to adjust the colours of the objects, participants used the number pad of the
keyboard. Here, the keys ‘2’, ‘4’, ‘6’, and ‘8’ corresponded to the poles of the chromatic DKL
axes. The poles of the axes were assigned to these keys so that the keys reflect the opponent
logic of the colours: ‘4’ corresponded to the greenish and ‘6’ to the opponent reddish pole;
‘2’ could be pressed to make the image more bluish and ‘8’ to shift the hue towards the
opponent yellowish colour. As the adjustment approached the grey point, ie the origin of the
colour space, the colour distribution was compressed, as described in detail by Olkkonen
et al (2008). In this way, images were in fact completely achromatic at the objective grey
point. Participants could switch between a coarse (key ‘9’) and a fine (key ‘3’) adjustment
step. At the beginning of each trial the coarse step adjustment was turned on. After finishing
the adjustment of a particular object, participants had to press the space bar to confirm the
adjusted colour and to proceed with the presentation of the next stimulus. However, in order
to guarantee that participants were fine-tuning their adjustments before continuing with
the next stimulus, participants could confirm and end the respective adjustment only if they
were in fine-tuning mode. If a participant got stuck with his or her adjustment, he or she
could press the key ‘1’ to reset the object to the start colour. Finally, owing to the limitations
of the monitor gamut objects cannot become infinitely saturated. If a participant passed with
more than 20% of the pixels over the gamut, an announcement appeared. The participant
had to shift the colour distribution back into the gamut before continuing any adjustment.
36 C Witzel, H Valkova, T Hansen, K R Gegenfurtner
Therefore, the adjustments were blocked for all colour directions except the direction that
was opponent to the direction in which the gamut had been transgressed.
After an oral introduction to the experiment, instructions were presented on the screen
so that participants adapted to the illumination. Before the main task we presented the
colour-neutral object (the sock), in its original colours (red with orange stripes), and asked
participants to memorise this colour in order to adjust it afterwards. They had to press
space to end the presentation and to continue with the instructions. Then the experiment
proceeded with the part with either the typical or the achromatic adjustments. The order
of these conditions was randomised. Each of these parts began with practice trials. After a
pause, the main blocks began. In one block all stimuli were adjusted once in random order.
There were three blocks per condition. In the achromatic condition the main as well as the
practice trials also included the adjustment of the uniform and the noise disk. The complete
experiment lasted on average 56 min.
3.2 Results
For the colour adjustments of the objects, some single measurements appeared to be
inconsistent with the aim of the task. For example, in the achromatic conditions some
stimuli have been adjusted to their typical colour, and vice versa. We discarded outliers
of this kind through the following criterion. For each object we lumped all measurements
together, ie all repetitions across all participants. Then, we calculated the average and the
standard deviation of these adjustments along either the x-axis or the y-axis. For each object
we discarded adjustments that deviated from the average along the x-axis or along the y-axis
(or both) by two standard deviations. For comparisons of averages, t-tests will be used. If
not mentioned otherwise, they will test across participants. Note that in some such t-tests
the degrees of freedom may be only twenty three instead of twenty four for twenty-five
participants. This was the case when for one of the participants all three adjustments of a
particular object were outliers in regard to the criterion above. However, neither the inclusion
of such outliers nor the exclusion of the participant with the highest amount of outliers
changed the pattern of the results in any way. Alpha was set to 0.05.
3.2.1 Typical adjustments. The average typical adjustments are shown in figure 4a. By the
criterion of two standard deviations, 8% of the typical adjustments were excluded. The
interindividual standard errors averaged over the colour diagnostic objects were 0.035 and
0.036 for the x-axis and y-axis (of the DKL space), respectively. In comparison, the standard
errors of the typical adjustments of the golf ball were 0.018 and 0.028, and of the sock 0.031
and 0.035, along the x-axis and y-axis, respectively.
3.2.2 Achromatic adjustments. The average achromatic adjustments are shown in figure 4b.
Of the achromatic adjustments, we discarded 8% as outliers. Interindividual standard errors
averaged over colour diagnostic objects were 0.009 and 0.014 for the x-axis and y-axis,
respectively. Achromatic adjustments were aligned towards a particular direction so that x
and y values were significantly positively correlated, r = 0.80, p < 0.01, n = 18. On the basis
on the covariance, a principal component with a slope of 72 deg. could explain 96% of the
variance of these adjustments.
We determined the subjective grey point of each participant by averaging the adjustments
for the uniform and noise disks. When averaged over all participants, we observed that the
subjective grey points tended to be shifted towards blue, x =−0.015, y =−0.020, azimuth = 232
deg. This shift was significant on the x-axis, t(24) = −3.0, p < 0.01, and the y-axis, t(24) = −2.4,
p = 0.03. The achromatic adjustments of the grey-shaded golf ball and the colour-neutral
sock were shifted in approximately the same direction as the subjective grey point (azimuths
of 214 deg. and 225 deg., respectively). The average adjustments of the white golf ball were
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−0.019 and −0.012 with interindividual standard errors of 0.012 and 0.021 on the x-axis and
y-axis, respectively. The difference of these adjustments to the subjective grey point was not
significant in a paired t-test, neither for the x-axis, t(23) = 0.25, p = 0.81, nor for the y-axis,
t(23) = 0.41, p = 0.69. The average adjustment of the colour-neutral sock was −0.018 and
−0.018 with standard errors of 0.010 and 0.019 on the x-axis and y-axis, respectively. And
these adjustments were not significantly different from the subjective grey point, t(23) =
0.065, p = 0.95 on the x-axis and t(23) = −0.22, p = 0.83 on the y-axis.
When removing the control stimuli (golf ball, sock, and disks), the correlation of x
and y values (r = 0.76) as well as the direction of the principal component stays almost
identical (azimuth = 72 deg., variance explained = 96%). We calculated a paired t-test over the
average adjustments per participants in order to compare whether the adjustments deviated
significantly from the subjective grey point on the x-axis or the y-axis. With Bonferroni
adjustment (alpha = 0.025), the achromatic adjustments of the heart, the ping-pong table,
the smurf, the blue traffic sign, and the Nivea tin differed significantly on both axes from
the adjustments of the subjective grey. For the Coca Cola, the chair, the mailbox, the UHU
stick, and the Milka bar this was true only for the y-axis. For the Pink Panther the difference
along the x-axis was almost significant (p = 0.026). The adjustments of the fire extinguisher,
Die Maus, and the closet did not differ significantly along any axis (all p > 0.05). The shifts
along the axes, however, do not reflect whether they occurred in the opponent direction of
the typical colour of the object. To get a first impression, the comparison of the achromatic
adjustments in figure 4b with the typical adjustments in figure 4a allow for a rough graphical
evaluation of this question.
3.2.3 Memory colour index. In order to evaluate how much the achromatic adjustments were
shifted to the opposite colour of the typical adjustments, we calculated the MCI proposed
by Hansen et al (2006, page 1367; see also Olkkonen et al 2008, page 6). For the MCI the
achromatic adjustments are projected on the axis of the typical adjustments that leads
through the subjective grey point. The distance of this projection from the subjective grey
point measures how strong the shift along this axis was. For the MCI this measure is divided
by the length, ie the saturation, of the typical adjustment. In this way, the MCI represents the
ratio of achromatic shift relative to the colourfulness of the typical colour. The sign (+/–) of
the MCI reflects the direction in which the adjustment is shifted away from the subjective grey
point. A positive MCI indicates an achromatic adjustment opposite to the typical adjustment.
A negative MCI implies, contrary to the memory colour effect, that there is a shift of the
achromatic adjustments towards the same direction as the typical adjustments. The MCI has
been calculated separately for each participant using their subjective grey point. The average
MCIs for each colour diagnostic object are shown in figure 5.
The MCI for ten of the fourteen colour diagnostic objects was positive. This implies that
the achromatic adjustments of these objects were shifted towards the colour opposite to their
typical colour. The average MCI over all fourteen colour diagnostic objects was 3.31% and
significant across the objects, t(13) = 2.97, p < 0.01. Right-tailed t-tests across the averages of
the participants revealed that for seven of these fourteen objects this shift was significantly
higher than zero. These objects were the following, listed in descending order of their MCI:
the Nivea tin with an average MCI of 10.3%, t(24) = 5.9, p < 0.01, UHU with an MCI of 8.5%,
t(23)=3.9, p<0.01, the blue traffic sign with an MCI of 8.4%, t(23) = 5.8, p < 0.01, the Milka bar
with an MCI of 6.0%, t(23) = 4.6, p < 0.01, the mailbox with an MCI of 4.8%, t(24) = 3.4, p <
0.01, the smurf with an MCI of 4.7, t(24) = 4.1, p < 0.01, and the Pink Panther with an MCI of
3.0%, t(23) = 2.7, p < 0.01. In contrast, for the heart a left-tailed t-test revealed that the MCI
of −4.4% was significantly smaller than zero, t(24) = −4.2, p < 0.01. Finally, the MCI for the
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Figure 4. Adjustments for each object in DKL colour space. The DKL space is scaled so that along
the axes an absolute value of 1 corresponds to the monitor gamut. The coloured ring represents hue
variation along the azimuth in DKL colour space. It is shown with a radius of value 0.1 in both graphics.
In this way, it also indicates the difference in scale between the two graphics. The coloured symbols
show the adjustments, averaged over repetitions and participants. The lines crossing the disks are the
standard errors of mean for the x-axis and y-axis across participants. The black pentagram represents
the average subjective grey-point. (a) Typical adjustments for each object. (b) Achromatic adjustments
for each object. The DKL space is zoomed in to values between−0.1 and 0.1. The dashed grey line is the
daylight axis, shifted so that the correlated colour temperature of 6500 (standard illuminant d65) falls
into the subjective grey point. Figure (a) shows that participants adjusted the correct typical colours
quite reliably. In figure (b) the shifts of the achromatic adjustments are stronger along the daylight
axis. A comparison of the corresponding symbols in figures (b) and (a) shows that most achromatic
adjustments were shifted towards the opposite direction of the typical adjustments as assumed for the
memory colour effect.
colour-neutral sock was 0.2% and was far from a significant difference from zero, t(23) = 0.1,
p = 0.90.
3.3 Discussion
We investigated whether achromatic adjustments of the artificial objects’ colours were shifted
towards the opposite direction of the typical adjustments. This, we assumed, should be due
to the influence of memory colours on colour appearance. We found such a shift for most
of the objects. As measured through the MCI, this shift could reach up to over 10% of the
typical colour such as it was the case for the Nivea tin. The amount of this shift indicates how
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Figure 5. Memory colour indices (MCIs) for each object. Bars show the MCI in percent averaged over
participants. Error bars represent standard errors of mean. Bars are ordered according to the azimuth
of the objects’ typical colours. Double asterisks (**) indicate that the average MCI of the respective
object is significantly different from zero in a paired one-sided t-test across participants and with an
alpha of 0.01. Congruent with the memory colour effect, for ten out of fourteen objects the MCI is
higher than zero, and for seven of these objects this difference was significant. For the heart the MCI is
significantly lower than zero. However, across all objects the MCI is still significantly above zero, thus
confirming the pattern of the memory colour effect.
much of the typical colour people still see when the object is actually grey, since it is this
apparent colour that they counteract by shifting the object’s colour towards the opponent
colour. At the same time, the golf ball should not show any systematic shift of the achromatic
adjustments because its typical colour is achromatic. The sock was expected not to show
a systematic shift, either, because it is a colour-neutral object. The participants saw it only
once in its original colour at the beginning of the experiment. This was enough for them to
set its typical colour correctly, but it should not be sufficient to internalise its object–colour
association. And, indeed, there was no systematic shift away from the subjective grey point
for either of these two control objects. So, the systematic shifts are indeed bound to people’s
knowledge about the object–colour association, and may be interpreted as memory colour
effects.
Nonetheless, we also observed three particularities that need further discussion. Firstly,
the subjective grey point, as measured through colour-neutral disks, was significantly shifted
towards blue. Secondly, we found an alignment of achromatic colour adjustments along an
axis that connects blue and yellow. Finally, we observed that the memory colour effect did
not appear to have the same magnitude for all objects. In particular, red and orange stimuli
did not yield positive MCIs. In the next three sections we will discuss possible origins of these
phenomena and their implication for the interpretation of positive MCIs as memory colour
effects. Together they will answer the questions which features of the stimuli are responsible
for positive MCIs, and whether the MCI really reflects memory colour effects.
3.3.1 Grey-point shifts. We observed that the subjective grey point, as measured through
the achromatic adjustments of the uniform and noise disks, was slightly shifted away from
the grey point of the monitor background towards a bluish hue. The same was true for
the achromatic adjustments of the two control stimuli of our experiment, the golf ball and
the colour-neutral sock. Such a shift might be due to a mismatch between the monitor
background and the lamps. However, the preceding studies on the memory colour effect
revealed the same phenomenon (Hansen et al 2006, figure 2b; Olkkonen et al 2008, figures
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3a and 3b). The monitor and background had been readjusted by four new observers for
the present study. For this reason it is very unlikely that the same distortion reoccurred by
accident for both, our calibration and the one of the preceding experiments. Additionally,
other colour adjustment studies also found such a systematic shift of achromatic colours
towards blue, when adjustments were made on a monitor (Granzier et al 2009; Oicherman et
al 2009). These studies systematically investigated shifts of colour adjustments in a particular
direction and used very different setups.
Owing to the colour adjustment technique used in this experiment, objects with a colour
distribution, such as the UHU glue stick, exhibit a colour distribution at the subjective grey
point. This colour distribution spans from the objective grey point [ie the origin (0, 0) of
DKL colour space] to the subjective grey point. Only when these objects are adjusted to the
objective grey-point is their colour distribution compressed so that there are only differences
in lightness, but none in hue and saturation (for details see figure S3 in the supplementary
material). As a result, objects with colour distributions have different nuances in hue and
saturation when adjusted to the subjective grey point. However, for all of these objects the
colour distributions at the subjective grey point are very narrow (see in particular figure
S3c-d). For colour diagnostic objects, which yield a memory colour effect, the distribution
at the average achromatic adjustment is much larger (see in particular figure S3e-f). This,
however, is not the case for the colour-neutral object (the sock), which also has a complex
colour distribution (see figure S4 in the supplementary material). Overall, the grey point shift
cannot account for the shifts of the achromatic adjustments of the colour diagnostic objects
for at least two reasons. Firstly, in our study the shifts for the colour diagnostic objects also
occur in the direction that is opposite of the grey point shift. Indeed, the blue and violet
stimuli (Nivea, traffic sign, smurf, Milka) that were adjusted in the direction opposite to the
grey point shift yielded the strongest shifts away from the grey point, and hence highest MCIs.
Furthermore, the shifts of the colour diagnostic objects were much stronger than the shift of
the subjective grey point. One idea might be that this is the case because the grey point shifts
are stronger for complex objects in contrast to the simple disks. Then this should also occur
for the adjustments of the two control objects, the sock and the golf ball. But it did not: the
achromatic adjustments of the control objects were not shifted beyond the subjective grey
point, but coincided almost exactly with it. Another observation that contradicts this idea is
that objects without a complex colour distribution, such as the smurf or the traffic sign, did
also yield memory colour effects.
In sum, there seems to be a systematic shift of the subjective grey point for colour adjust-
ments on the monitor. However, this phenomenon does not undermine the interpretation of
our results as memory colour effects. Additionally, we compensated for this systematic grey
point shift by using the subjective grey point when evaluating memory colour effects.
3.3.2 Correlation along the blue–yellow axis. We found a correlation between the x and
y values of the achromatic adjustments of all stimuli. This shows that the achromatic
adjustments in general were aligned along an axis that passes from the bluish to the yellowish
part of the colour space (cf figure 4b). This phenomenon was also present in previous studies
on the memory colour effect in that the x- and y-coordinates of all achromatic adjustments
(including the two kinds of disks) also correlated positively. In Hansen et al (2006) this
correlation was high, but due to the small number of stimuli only marginally significant,
r= 0.633, p = 0.067, n = 9. The second part of the first experiment of Olkkonen et al (2008)
contained the highest number of different stimuli (ie five photos of fruits, five photos of
white-painted fruits, five outline shapes, and two kinds of disks). Here, this correlation is
clearly confirmed, r = 0.86, p < 0.01, n = 17. In both studies the total variance of the x- and
y-axes may be represented by a principal component to 88% and 96%, respectively. The
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slope of this principal component is the same in both studies (68 deg.) and very close to the
one we found for the achromatic adjustments in our study (72 deg.). In fact, a closer look
at the respective figures (Hansen et al 2006, figure 2b; Olkkonen et al 2008, figures 3a and
3b) reveals that the achromatic adjustments were not exactly oriented in the direction of the
colour that is opponent to the typical colour. Instead, they were all slightly but consistently
tilted away from the exact opponent colour towards the bluish direction. Furthermore, this
enhanced variation of the achromatic adjustments along the blue–yellow axis is consistent
with the MCIs. In our study MCIs correlated positively with the distance of the achromatic
adjustments to the subjective grey-point along this axis, r = 0.55, p = 0.04, n =14. While this
correlation was not significant for the small sample of stimuli in Hansen et al (2006), r = 0.41,
p = 0.36, n = 7, it clearly was present in Olkkonen et al (2008, experiment 1 part 2), r = 0.68, p
< 0.01, n = 15. The question arises of why achromatic adjustments were shifted more strongly
along the blue–yellow axis.
A candidate correlate of the blue–yellow axis may be the variation of daylight hue. Natural
daylight varies along an axis from blue to yellow (Mollon 2006; Wyszecki and Stiles 2000, page
7). This is due to the combination of different amounts of direct yellow sunlight and bluish
diffusion through Rayleigh scattering. Consequently, the absolute hue of an object may vary
along this blue–yellow axis across the day, whereas it stays relatively stable on the orthogonal
greenish-to-reddish axis. This implies that in their natural environment people are exposed
to uncertain information about the object’s hues along the daylight axis. As a result they might
also be less certain when estimating an object’s colour along this axis. This idea is supported
by research on the subjective white point. When participants were to set white points, these
estimations vary more strongly along the blue–yellow axis (Beer et al 2006; Halen et al 2010).
In order to verify whether this is also true for the achromatic settings in our experiment,
we analysed intraindividual and interindividual variations of the achromatic settings for
the control stimuli (see figure 6). These were the uniform disk, the noise disk, the golf ball,
and the sock. Interindividual variation refers to the variation of achromatic adjustments for
each of the four objects averaged for each participant (four objects x twenty-five participants
minus outliers). In contrast, intraindividual variation consists of the variation of achromatic
adjustments around the average for each individual and each object (four objects x twenty-
five participants x three repetitions minus outliers). For this intraindividual variation, x and
y-coordinates correlated with r = 0.57 (p < 0.01, n = 279). This common variation may be
represented by a principal component with a slope of 64° and an explained variance of 83%.
For the interindividual variation, the correlation between x and y values was r = 0.72 (p < 0.01,
n = 98), and the principal component was tilted by an angle of 65 deg. (explained variance =
90%). This implies that people are less certain about the estimation of grey along an axis close
to 65 deg. The daylight axis may be approximated by the correlated colour temperature (CCT)
(Wyszecki and Stiles 2000, page 7). The slope of the CCT in the segment of the DKL space that
contains the typical stimulus colours (x and y varying from -1 to 1) is 57 deg. So, the main
variations of the estimations of subjective grey (65 deg.) align quite well with the variation of
daylight (57 deg.). This indicates that people are uncertain in their estimation of achromatic
colours along the axis on which the hue of an object varies under natural illuminations.
The main variation of the achromatic adjustments for all sixteen objects had a slope of 72
deg. The deviation of 16 deg. of this variation from the daylight axis may be due to the fact
that this variation is also oriented by memory colour effects. Because of this, its slope should
depend on the stimulus sampling in that the typical colours of the objects in the sample
determine the orientations of the respective memory colour effects. This may deflect the
achromatic adjustments from the exact orientation of the daylight axis. Nevertheless, we still
find a considerable alignment with the blue–yellow axis (cf figure 4b). So, the actual slope of
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this axis might be a combination of both memory colour effects and uncertainty about the
colour estimation along the daylight axis. In this way, uncertainty along the daylight axis may
well be the explanation for the alignment of achromatic adjustments with an axis that goes
from blue to yellow. Of course, it might also be the case that luminance information interacts
with daylight variation since the amount of blue and yellow hue in daylight is related to the
height of the sun during the day. An object that appears comparatively light might be set to a
more yellowish grey since higher lightness levels are associated with more yellow through
more direct sunlight.
Figure 6. Variability of achromatic adjustments for control stimuli. The dots represent the single
adjustments of four control stimuli: The two kinds of disks (black dots), the golf ball (light grey), and
the colour-neutral sock (dark grey). The red curve is the principal component that represents the main
common variation of x and y values. In order to illustrate daylight variation, the correlated colour
temperature is shown as a curve that is coloured according to the actual hues that correspond to the
coordinates. (a) Intraindividual variability: the coloured dots depict the single adjustments for all
participants after subtraction of the respective participant’s mean. (b) Interindividual variability: the
coloured dots show the average adjustments for each object and each participant.
3.3.3 Determinants of memory colour effects. There were strong differences of memory colour
effects across our colour diagnostic objects. These variations in MCIs cannot be explained
through the level of colour diagnosticity as reflected in the reaction times of our preliminary
experiment. Reaction times and MCIs were not correlated for our stimuli, r = 0.13, p = 0.66, n
=14.
Furthermore, these differences across objects may not be attributed to surface complexity
or the level of abstractness of the colour diagnostic features (cf figure 5 with figure 3). Indeed,
we observed that memory colour effects appeared independently of these two dimensions.
On the one hand, among those images eliciting a memory colour effect there were not only
three-dimensional objects like the Nivea tin, the mailbox, and the UHU glue stick, but also
two-dimensional objects such as the Milka chocolate bar. Even objects that consisted just of
uniform colour patches yielded memory colour effects, such as the smurf or the Pink Panther.
At the same time, the images that did not elicit memory colour effects also included three-
dimensional instances, such as the fire extinguisher. On the other hand, not only concrete
objects such as the smurf or the Pink Panther led to memory colour effects. Memory colour
effects also occurred for more abstract object–colour associations. They were elicited by
symbols such as the blue traffic sign or the Post symbol on the German mailbox. Moreover,
they also appeared for logos, whose main characteristic is a written name that refers to a
company. This is the case for the Milka and the Nivea logo.
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Instead, the main determinant of the variability of the MCIs is the typical colour of the
objects (figure 5). In fact, it seems that the MCIs are highest for objects with typical colours
that are close to the yellow–blue axis such as yellow, blue, and violet. And they are low for
objects with colours that lie orthogonal to this axis such as red, orange, green, and pink.
To apprehend the alignment of the objects’ typical colours along the blue–yellow axis, we
calculated the absolute angular distance of the adjustments of the typical colours from the
angle of the principal component of the achromatic adjustments. These distances predicted
well the MCI of each colour diagnostic object, r = -0.67, p < 0.01, n = 14. This shows that
memory colour effects are enhanced along this axis. The boosted variation of the achromatic
adjustments along the blue–yellow axis is a main determinant of the variability of the MCIs.
Still, not all variations of the MCIs may be explained through the enhancement of shifts
along the blue–yellow axis. We also found that the x-coordinates of the typical adjustments
(not the achromatic ones, as in the previous section) do well predict the MCIs, r = -0.69, p
< 0.01, n = 14. This is due to the fact that some colours with low x values, such as blue and
purple, led to particularly high MCIs, whereas colours with high x values, such as orange
and red, yielded extremely low MCIs. For example, memory colour effects for red objects
such as the Coca Cola logo or the fire extinguisher were close to zero. For the heart, we even
found a significantly negative MCI. These results are in line with previous findings. Most
of the classical studies that failed to replicate consistent memory colour effects used red
objects (Bolles et al 1959; Bruner et al 1951, experiment 1; Fisher et al 1956). In particular, the
heart led to results that were ambiguous (Harper 1953, page 88; cf heart and ‘Y ’ in table 1) or
even reverse to those predicted through the memory colour effect (Fisher et al 1956, page
550). Furthermore, Olkkonen et al (2008) did not find consistent memory colour effects for
the red strawberry either. At the same time, the uncertainty along the daylight axis may
not completely account for the achromatic adjustments of the red objects. If there is high
uncertainty in the direction of the typical colour of an object, there should be a shift that
is congruent with the memory colour effect. If there is little uncertainty in the direction of
the typical colour, the adjustments should vary along the daylight axis, but the average of
this variation should not be systematically shifted. In contrast the heart and the Coca Cola
logo were shifted significantly away from the subjective grey point (see results for achromatic
adjustments) in a direction that is not congruent with the memory colour effect (cf figure 5).
As can be seen in figure 4b, the red objects are shifted in the yellow direction and for the heart
the magnitude of this shift is even equivalent to the shifts that were due to memory colour
effects, such as the ones for the smurf, the Milka bar, and the blue traffic sign. Together, these
findings show that red colours may elicit special effects on colour appearance that interact
with or supersede memory colour effects.
In sum, there are several factors other than colour diagnosticity that modulate the strength
of the memory colour effect. This may explain why, for our artificial objects, there is no
direct correlation between memory colour effects (experiment 2) and colour diagnosticity as
measured by reaction times (experiment 1). Certainly, recognisability and subjective colour
diagnosticity of the objects are necessary conditions to produce memory colour effects. On
the one hand, the impact of recognisability is shown by the correlation between reaction
times and memory colour effects for the fruit stimuli of Olkkonen et al (2008). The photos of
the painted fruits and the outline shapes have the same colour diagnosticity as the photos of
the original fruits since they depict the same objects. At the same time, they expose fewer
characteristic features than the original fruits in that they miss the typical texture and, in
the case of the outline shapes, 3-dimensional shape. And, indeed, all outline shapes yielded
low MCIs and, apart from the banana, comparatively high reaction times (cf figure 1; see
also discussion of experiment 1). On the other hand, the necessity of colour diagnosticy for
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memory–colour effects is shown by the fact that the sock, being an object with no subjective
colour diagnosticity, did not yield a memory colour effect.
Apart from recognisabiltiy and colour diagnosticity as necessary preconditions, we found
that the variation along the daylight axis as well as the special effects for red objects modulates
the size of the memory colour effects. This may already be observed for the fruit stimuli of
Olkkonen et al (2008). For example, the photo of the original banana, with a colour close
to the daylight axis, yielded particularly high memory colour effects while the photo of the
red strawberry produced particularly low memory colour effects. This was the case even
though the reaction times for the photos of both fruits were comparable (cf figure 1). As a
consequence, the correlation between reaction times and memory colour indices cannot
completely predict the memory colour effects (only by 27% of the variance, see results of
part 1). For our second experiment we chose objects that were all perfectly recognisable
and maximally colour diagnostic according to accuracy rates and reaction times in the
first experiment. The maximisation of colour diagnosticiy through the stimulus selection
drastically reduced the variability of reaction times on a coarse scale. And it is at this scale
that our reaction time measurements reflect colour diagnosticity (see evaluation of paradigm
in the discussion of experiment 1). The residual variability of reaction times across these
preselected objects may not only be caused by differences in colour diagnosticity. Instead,
it may also be due to the strength of the contrast between the two colour categories in
a response pair, the size of the stimulus samples per category, as well as variations in
apparent lightness (see introduction to methods and evaluation of paradigm of experiment
1). Although we cannot totally exclude variations of colour diagnosticity across this stimulus
sample; it is clear that compared with the experiment of Olkkonen et al such variations are
comparatively low due to the preselection. The absence of a meaningful variation in colour
diagnosticity across the selected artificial objects may explain the absence of a correlation
between reaction times and memory colour indices. For our data the typical colours of the
objects were much stronger predictors of the memory colour effects than the reaction times.
4 Conclusion
We investigated whether there is a memory colour effect for artificial, man-made objects.
Through a reaction time experiment we guaranteed that the images of these man-made
objects are well recognisable and that the objects are highly colour diagnostic for all
participants. We may draw four kinds of conclusions.
Firstly, we found clear memory colour effects for artificial objects. Since these objects
are tied to a particular cultural context, their association with a typical colour must have
been learned in everyday life. Therefore, we conclude that acquired knowledge about objects
modulates their colour appearance. These findings provide further evidence that object
recognition and colour appearance interact in high-level vision. Moreover, they show that
these interactions are mediated through past experience. In this way, they also support the
idea that learning influences perception. Future studies about the memory colour effect
should investigate the exact way in which learning of object colours affects their colour
appearance. Therefore, these future studies should directly control the learning process
itself.
Secondly, memory colour effects were particularly high for colours that were close to the
daylight axis. The further colours were away from the daylight axis, the lower was the memory
colour effect. At the same time, our findings indicate that people are less certain in the colour
estimation along the daylight axis. This may be explained by the fact that the actual colour of
a particular object varies along this axis under different natural daylight illuminations. We
conclude that memory colours compensate the uncertainty about the absolute colours of
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objects. In order to encounter this uncertainty, people resort more to their memory colours
for colour estimations along the daylight axis than is the case for colours orthogonal to
this axis. This supports once again the idea that colour appearance in particular and vision
in general is strongly adapted to ecological constraints. It may be fruitful to investigate
systematically the precise effects of uncertainty and of variations along the daylight axis on
memory colours and colour memory. Moreover, future investigations should also address
the precise implications of luminance information in colour adjustments and its connection
to memory colour effects. We also found some particularities for red objects that could not
be explained by the interaction between uncertainty and memory colour effects. At the same
time, particular effects for red have also been shown for colour preferences (Bornstein et al
1976; Franklin et al 2009; Maier et al 2009) and for human behaviour in general (Elliot and
Niesta 2008; Elliot et al 2007; 2009; Hagemann et al 2008; Hill and Barton 2005). Therefore,
we wonder whether our results are linked to the fact that saturated red colours have special
communicative functions in the natural environment, such as indicating alert, nutritious
fruits, and sexual dispositions (for a discussion see, eg, Fernandez and Morris 2007, page 10).
Thirdly, we could observe that the memory colour effect for our stimuli appeared inde-
pendently of their perceptual complexity and of the abstractness of their colour diagnostic
characteristics. On the one hand, our results exemplify that the memory colour effect also
exists for two-dimensional objects with uniform colours. This implies that the effect does
not presuppose three dimensionality, texture, or complex colour distributions. Moreover,
we may further specify the findings of previous studies (Hansen and Gegenfurtner 2006;
Olkkonen et al 2008), which show that classical experiments yield particularly unstable
memory colour effects because they used outline shapes as stimuli. Since the memory colour
effect does not depend on the perceptual complexity of the stimuli, the weak memory colour
effect for outline shapes seems to be due not to the poverty of their surface structure, but
to the fact that they are less recognisable. This is further supported by the finding that the
outline shapes yielded higher reaction times than the photos in our first experiment. Taken
together, our findings suggest that the memory colour effect appears most strongly for stimuli
that correspond to the visual experiences with which people were originally familiarised
in their everyday life. On the other hand, we found that even symbols and writings that
refer to abstract ideas may elicit a memory colour effect. Together with earlier studies (eg
Joseph and Proffitt 1996; Naor-Raz et al 2003) these results point towards the important
role of conceptual knowledge about object–colour associations in object recognition (for a
discussion see, eg, Tanaka et al 2001). In how far the memory colour effect is modulated by
perceptual features or whether it may be induced by pure conceptual knowledge is an open
question for future research.
Finally, the evaluation of our reaction time paradigm provides a methodological contri-
bution. The reaction times for the colour categorisation of achromatic images measured
well their subjective, automatic colour diagnosticity. Our results show that this measure may
identify candidate stimuli that have the potential to yield memory colour effects. However,
the precise relationship between colour diagnosticity and memory colour effects could
not be investigated. In the current implementation other determinants apart from colour
diagnosticity may have modulated the size of the reaction times and the strength of the
memory colour effects. Our findings suggest that at least the recognisability and the typical
colours (ie, the effect of the daylight axis and red) of the objects must be controlled in order
to measure the strength of this relationship. Moreover, our measurements cannot yet provide
general insights about object-specific colour diagnosticity or the relationship between colour
categories and object colours. In order to investigate effects of particular objects or categories,
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it might be fruitful to apply our method to stimulus sets that are comparable across categories
and that contain standardised depictions of the respective objects.
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